盈余管理新形式层出不穷,然而现有的盈余管理研究主要聚焦于以净利润为目标的盈余管理,鲜有关注其他利润指标(如,属于母公司所有者的净利润、少数股东损益)的管理或操纵。本文以乐视网公司为案例,以归母净利润和少数股东损益为核心数据,取同行业的同时期数据进行比较,从母子公司盈余管理程度和大股东与少数股东收益率差距两方面探究乐视网公司是否存在“拆借式”盈余管理的行为以及该种行为的程度高低,在通过非参数检验的方法排除其他因素的干扰,得出结论:乐视网公司确实存在“拆借式”盈余管理,并提出监管机构和投资者们应更加关注归母净利润、少数股东损益等其他指标的变化,以做出正确的判断。New forms of earnings management emerge in an endless stream. However, the existing research on earnings management mainly focuses on earnings management aiming at net profit, and rarely pays attention to the management or manipulation of other profit indicators (such as the net profit attributable to the owners of the parent company and the profit or loss of minority shareholders). Taking LeTV as a case, this paper uses the net profit attributable to the parent company and the profit or loss of minority shareholders as the core data, and compares them with the data of the same period in the same industry. It explores whether LeTV has carried out “inter-borrowing” earnings management and the degree of such behavior from two aspects: the degree of earnings management of the parent and subsidiary companies and the gap between the return rates of major shareholders and minority shareholders. After excluding the interference of other factors through the non-parametric test method, it concludes that LeTV does have “inter-borrowing” earnings management. It also proposes that regulatory authorities and investors should pay more attention to the changes in other indicators such as the net profit attributable
